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There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely
associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups.
This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobby-
ing activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political
corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate
political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral
competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn
stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt
behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter
the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.
1 Introduction
“Democracy gives citizens a role in choosing their leaders. Thus,
corrupt elected oﬃcials can be voted out of oﬃce. But democracy
is not necessarily a cure for all corruption.” (Rose-Ackerman [8])
This paper addresses an important issue. Can electoral competition
eliminate political corruption and promote more eﬃcient policy decisions?
The answer to this question has far reaching policy implications for both de-
veloped and developing countries. A growing body of literature has demon-
strated that political corruption impedes economic growth (Mauro [7]), in-
hibits investment (Bardhan [1]), and stiﬂes the entry of new enterprises
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1(Manion [6]). Thus, if greater electoral competition can reduce the degree
of corruption, this may induce more eﬃcient economic policy decisions. This
link between electoral competition and corruption does not appear to have
been fully investigated in the existing literature.
A growing body of evidence suggests that political corruption is often
closely linked to the lobbying activities of special interest groups. While sta-
tistical measures of the link between political corruption and lobbying are
diﬃcult to obtain because of the clandestine nature of these activities, anec-
dotal evidence abounds. Media reports describing the corruption inﬂuence
of lobby groups appear with regular frequency. The scandals over countries
as varied in political institutions and development levels as the USA, UK,
and France to Indonesia, and India. Among more widely publicized cases
are the Italian experience, where anti-corruption investigations unearthed
evidence of campaign funds being misappropriated for personal and party
political purposes and of the Christian Democratic Party in Germany with
secret payments made to its “slush funds”.1 There is a substantial liter-
ature on rent seeking by special interest groups (see, for instance, Baron
[2], Grossman and Helpman [4] and Grossman and Helpman [5]). However,
this literature appears to have ignored the interaction between the level of
corruption and the activities of lobby groups.
This paper explores two key issues. First, we examine the link between
the activities of lobby groups and the incidence of political corruption. Sec-
ond, we determine whether electoral competition can (i) reduce corruption
and (ii) mitigate the distortionary inﬂuence of lobby groups on policy de-
cisions. The conclusions which emerge are striking. Electoral competition
merely serves to alter the type of corrupt behavior that eventuates, but can-
not eliminate it. However, greater electoral competition may promote more
eﬃcient policy making.
We consider a situation in which politicians are self interested and pro-
pose policies to maximize their utility. Special interest groups seek to inﬂu-
ence the policy outcome by making campaign donations to political parties
or politicians. The existing rent seeking literature assumes that when lobby
groups make contributions to political parties for electoral purposes, these
funds are used by the parties to ﬁnance election campaigns (see for instance
Baron [2], Fredriksson [3], Grossman and Helpman [4] and Grossman and
1The Economist, 15 January 2000.
2Helpman [5]). However, while payment of a political contribution may in-
volve some degree of tacit reciprocity between the donor and the recipient,
there is no legally binding contract to ensure that the funds are used for
the purposes intended by the donor. Thus, once a donation has been made,
a political party will renege on the agreement, if it is in its interests. For
instance, political contribution may be used for personal gain or political
purposes, rather than for campaigning on the issue desired by the interest
group. This is most likely occur when a donor has no credible means of
retaliation, or when the political party’s grip on power is uncertain. so that
threats of future retaliation are not eﬀective. The absence of enforcement
mechanism provides an opportunity for politicians to divert funds for per-
sonal use. This issue, which has been neglected, plays an important role in
our model.
The analysis is based on the well known model of Grossman and Help-
man [5], where two parties compete in an electorate consisting of informed
and uninformed voters. To attract votes from the uninformed electorate,
the parties engage in costly advertising and campaigning. A special interest
group seeks to inﬂuence the policy position of the parties by oﬀering con-
tributions, which are contingent upon the policy proposed by each party.
We assume that self interested politicians derive utility from income and
holding oﬃce. The parties therefore have an incentive to propose policies
which attract political contributions. These contributions are either used
for political campaigning or other non-electoral purposes. Since there is no
legally binding contract between the political party and the lobby group, the
donor is unable to prevent politicians from diverting funds to non-campaign
uses.
In deciding on the proportion of political contributions to be allocated to
various uses, the politicians confront a trade-oﬀ. Increasing the funds used
for campaigning raises the probability of winning the election. On the other
hand, money diverted for personal purposes yields utility, irrespective of
the election outcome. Each party allocates political contributions between
campaigning and other uses optimally.
The analysis based on the following sequence of events. In the ﬁrst stage
the political parties decide on the allocation of funds between campaign-
ing and other uses. The proportion of funds diverted for personal use is
interpreted as one form of corruption, and is deﬁned as the degree of em-
3bezzlement. In the second stage, the lobby group announces its contribution
schedules to the parties. Finally, the parties choose their policy platforms
and the contributions are paid. The extend to which policies are distorted
as a consequence of lobbying is yet another dimension of corruption in this
framework. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
We explore the impact of corruption on the lobby group’s incentive to
contribute to a party. Embezzlement of political contributions is likely to
have two conﬂicting eﬀects on lobby group donations. On the one hand,
lobbying is less productive when funds intended for campaigning diverted
for personal use, so that the lobby group may have less incentive to make
political contributions. However, in a sequential game there is an addi-
tional channel which reﬂects the ﬁrst mover advantage of the political party.
Speciﬁcally, the lobby group knows that in the absence of an enforcement
mechanism, its desired policy will be proposed by a political party only
if it is incentive compatible. This requires that the political party is ade-
quately compensated for the welfare loss it suﬀers from altering its policies.
A party which spends a lower proportion of its political contributions on
campaigning, suﬀers a greater loss when its policy deviates from the vote
maximizing strategy. To compensate for this the lobby group is compelled
to increase its political contributions. It is demonstrated that the sequential
eﬀects dominate so that a party which is known to divert a greater pro-
portion of campaign funds obtains larger political contributions. Somewhat
paradoxically, the more dishonest a party, the greater is its ability to attract
contributions.
We also show that as the intensity of electoral competition increases, the
proportion of funds diverted for personal use rises. Thus, electoral competi-
tion increases the level of corruption. This seemingly counterintuitive result
arises for the following reason. As the probability of winning an election
increases, the expected payoﬀs to a political party from allocating funds to
campaigning rises. There is therefore less incentive to divert funds to other
uses. Since less electoral competition induces more campaign spending, the
proposed policies are closer to the preferences of the lobby group. Electoral
competition thus alters the form of corrupt behavior, but does not elimi-
nate it. It reduces the level of policy distortions, but increases the degree of
embezzlement.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
4the basic structure of the model and examines the manner in which political
contributions vary with changes in corruption levels. Section 3 investigates
the eﬀects of electoral competition on contributions, and announced policies
and corruption levels. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Two political parties, denoted A and B, compete in an election contest.
The politicians in both parties are self interested. The utility function of
the representative politician from party A is given by
GA = s[(1 − θA)CA + R] + (1 − s)[(1 − θA)CA + L], (1)
where s = s(θACA,θBCB) is the probability that party A wins the election,
Cj ≥ 0 is the campaign contribution received by party j = A,B from
a special interest group, θj deﬁnes the proportion of these contributions
which are used for campaigning in the election by party j, (1−θA)CA is the
proportion of campaign contributions which are diverted for personal use
and other non-electoral purposes, R and L represent the payoﬀs when party
wins or looses the election, respectively. It is assumed that R > L.
Remark 2.1 Equation (1) reveals that politicians obtain greater utility from
winning an election, i.e., R > L. This is because of the higher salary and
beneﬁts which accrue to the winner and the “ego rents” of holding oﬃce.
The politicians obtain utility when campaign funds are diverted for per-
sonal consumption and other issues. On the other hand, the probability of
winning the election is assumed to depend on the proportion of funds each
party spends on campaigning, i.e., θjCj. It is supposed that the probability
that each party wins the election is increasing in its own campaign spending







The parties therefore confront the trade-oﬀ. While diverting campaign con-
tribution for personal use directly rises utility, it also diminishes the proba-
bility of winning the election.
5Party B is symmetric with utility given by
GB = (1 − s)[(1 − θB)CB + R] + s[(1 − θB)CB + L]. (2)
Following Grossman and Helpman [5], we assume that the parties com-
pete on two issues, that is, ideology, denoted I, and a pliable policy issue,
denoted P. Parties maintain ﬁxed positions on ideological matters. For
simplicity, let ideology be measured along the unit interval, i.e., I ∈ [0,1].
It is assumed that the parties adopt extreme points along this interval so
that party A’s ideology is represented by IA = 0 and party B’s ideology is
represented by IB = 1.
The pliable issues consist of policy matters on which the parties do not
have any prior ideological preferences.2 Each party’s announced policy po-
sition on the pliable issues is represented by
Pj ∈ [0,1], j = A,B.
There are two types of voters in the electorate, the informed and the
uninformed. There is a fraction (1 − α) of informed voters who have full
knowledge of the impact of policies on their welfare and therefore have well
deﬁned preferences over the pliable policy. We assume that their preferences
are given by
ui = −k|P − Pi| + βiI, (3)
where k > 0 is a constant, P is the policy which is expected by informed
voters to be implemented, Pi is the ideal pliable policy of informed voter i
and βi is the marginal utility from ideology I ∈ [0,1].
The Parties cannot observe either Pi or βi, but know that they are drawn
from independent uniform distributions. Following Grossman and Helpman

















2This might consist of issues such as public good provision, environmental regulations,
tariﬀs etc.
6where d is a measure of the uniformity of views. From the joint density
function, the proportion of the informed electorate who vote for party A
can be shown to be
1
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There are a fraction α of uninformed voters in the electorate who are
unable to assess the impact of the pliable policies on their welfare. They can
be persuaded to vote for a party through campaign advertisements. The
party which spends more on campaign advertisements captures a greater
number of their votes. These voters have a certain ideological preference for
one of the parties. As in Grossman and Helpman [5], the proportion of this
electorate who vote for party A is given by
1
2
+ b + h(θACA − θBCB), (5)
where b > 0 represents the inherent ideological bias of these voters for party
A, h > 0 measures the eﬀectiveness of the advertisement campaign.
Combining (4) and (5), the proportion of individuals who vote for party




















It is assumed that the eventual policy which is adopted is proportional to
the number of seats won by each party, i.e.,
P = sPA + (1 − s)PB.
There is one special interest lobby group which has well deﬁned prefer-
ences over the pliable policy issue. The interest group seeks to inﬂuence the
policy outcome by making campaign contributions to the parties in order
to induce them to adopt the policy platform that better serves its needs.
The lobby group has no ideological biases. Let Cj denote the campaign
contributions paid by the lobby group to party j, j = A,B. The utility of





 − CA − CB, (7)
where PL is the lobby group’s ideal policy. Without loss of generality, let
PL = 1.
Having outlined the general structure of the model, we shall now derive
the equilibrium level of contributions paid to each party. In the absence of
lobbying, party A would choose a pliable policy ˆ PA to maximize its utility,
as deﬁned in Equation (1). Thus,
ˆ PA = argmax(sR + (1 − s)L). (8)
Substituting for s when CA = 0, and solving the ﬁrst-order condition, it can
be veriﬁed that ˆ PA = 1/2.3 In this case the number of seats that party A













The resulting level of utility accruing to party A in the absence of lobbying
is
ˆ GA = ˆ sR + (1 − ˆ s)L. (9)
Suppose that the lobby group oﬀers party A a contribution to announce
a policy platform which is more closely aligned to its interest. Party A will
have an incentive to alter its policy only if the contributions received from
the lobby group are suﬃcient to compensate it for varying its policy from
its preferred position ˆ PA. Thus, contributions to party A must satisfy
GA > ˆ GA.
Substituting and simplifying, equilibrium contributions to party A are given
by
CA ≥
(1 − α)dk(R − L)(PA − ˆ PA)2
1 − θA + αhθA(R − L)
. (10)
3Analogously, it can be veriﬁed that in the absence of lobbying, party B’s utility
maximizing policy is ˆ PB = 1/2.
8Note that Equation (7) reveals that the lobby group’s utility is declining in
the contribution paid to each party. The lobby group therefore maximizes
its utility by oﬀering party A the minimum amount necessary to induce it
to modify its policy from its preferred position ˆ PA. Thus, in equilibrium,
contributions must satisfy (10) with equality. An analogous condition holds
for party B.
Having derived the contribution levels we now assess the manner in which
political contributions vary with certain parameters of the problem. One
dimension of corruption in this model is the proportion of funds which are
diverted for personal consumption. We begin by considering the impact of




−CA(αh(R − L) − 1)
1 − θA + αhθA(R − L)
< 0. (11)
Equation (11) reveals that political contributions increase as the proportion
of funds subverted for personal use rise. This result may seem counterintu-
itive, but arises for the following reason. The lobby group knows that in the
absence of an enforcement mechanism, its desired policy will be proposed by
a political party only if it is given the incentive to do so. This requires that
the political party be adequately compensated for the welfare loss which
suﬀers from adopting the lobby group’s preferred policy. A more corrupt
party spends a lower proportion of its political contributions on campaign-
ing and therefore suﬀers a greater loss, in electoral terms, when its policy
deviates from the vote maximizing strategy, ˆ PA. To compensate for this,
the lobby group is compelled to increase its political contributions. Thus,
ceteris paribus, the greater the degree of embezzlement, the higher are the
required contributions demanded and received by a corrupt party.
Consider next the eﬀect of an increase in the payoﬀs from winning the





(R − L)(1 − θA + αhθA(R − L))
> 0. (12)
As the rewards from winning an election increase, there is less incentive for
the party to alter its policy from the preferred position. Thus, the lobby
group is required to pay a larger compensation to the party when its policy
departs from the preferred position, ˆ PA.
93 Equilibrium Policy Positions
Having obtained the equilibrium level of contributions, we now solve for the
policy positions. As noted by Grossman and Helpman [5], the lobby group
can induce the political parties to announce any feasible policy platform so
long as the contributions adequately compensate them for the welfare loss
of departing from their preferred policy positions. Thus, the policy platform
announced by each party will maximize the lobby group’s payoﬀs, subject
to the constraint that each party is adequately compensated for the welfare
loss of varying the announced policy from its preferred position. Hence, the
lobby group solves the following problem:
max
Pj
uL = −k|P − PL| − CA − CB, (13)
subject to
CA =
(1 − α)dk(R − L)(PA − ˆ PA)




(1 − α)dk(R − L)(PB − ˆ PB)
1 − θB + αhθB(R − L)
,











An analogous condition holds for party B.




corruption, as measured by the degree of embezzlement, rises the lobby group
has less inﬂuence on the announced policy platform of a party, i.e.,
dPj
dθj > 0.
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Since we have assumed that ∂2uL
∂P2
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∂PA in (14) and further diﬀerentiating with respect
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Lemma 3.1 explores the manner in which policy platforms vary with
changes in the degree of embezzlement. Intuitively, a party which is more
corrupt, spends a lower proportion of contributions on campaigning. Thus,
contributions are less eﬀective in delivering the lobby group’s desired policy
11platform. Hence, as more funds are diverted for personal use, the lobby
group has less inﬂuence on the announced policy platform. Paradoxically,
this result suggest that in an election context parties which embezzle more
funds will stand on more independent platforms.
Lemma 3.2 As the proportion of funds diverted for personal use by one
party increases, the lobby group has greater inﬂuence on the announced policy
platform of its rival, i.e., dPi
dθj < 0, j = A,B, i 6= j.


































< 0, it follows that dPA
dθB < 0.
As, say, party A diverts a greater proportion of funds for personal use,
the lobby group has less inﬂuence on its policy, so that its contributions to
party A are less proﬁtable. It, therefore, has an incentive to lobby the rival
party B more intensively. Hence, party B’s announced policy moves closer
to the lobby group’s desired position.
We shall, now, explore the impact of electoral competition on policies.
Recall that the parameter b represents the bias of the electorate for party
A. Thus, as b rises, party A confronts less electoral competition.
Lemma 3.3 As the bias in the electorate for, say, party A increases, it
announces a policy platform which is closer to that of the lobby group, i.e.,
dPA
db > 0.























This completes the proof.
The lobby group ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to induce the more popular
party to ado[pt a platform that is closer to its preferred position. This is
simply because, ceteris paribus, contributions given to the popular party are
more productive in buying votes.
Turning to the ﬁrst stage of the game, each political party will choose
the proportion of funds it allocates to campaigning to maximize its wel-
fare. Thus, the degree of embezzlement which eventuates in equilibrium is
























A similar condition holds for party B.
Proposition 3.4 As electoral competition becomes more intense, the degree
of embezzlement rises, i.e., dθA
db > 0.
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db > 0. The proof follows.
Proposition 3.4 outlines the impact of electoral competition on corrup-
tion as a measure by the degree of embezzlement. With more intense po-
13litical competition, i.e., as b falls, there is less incentive to depart from the
average ideal policy of the informed voter. Hence, there is a greater incentive
to misappropriate campaign funds instead. Proposition 3.4 and Lemma 3.3
further combine to suggest that the more popular party will spend a greater
proportion of its funds on campaigning and adopt a policy platform that is
closer to the ideal of the lobby group. As a consequence its policy will be
further from the average preferences of the informed electorate.
We shall now determine the strategic interactions between the parties.
Proposition 3.5 Ceteris paribus, as one party allocates a greater propor-
tion of its lobby group contributions to campaigning, its rival has an incentive
to reduce the proportion of funds allocated to campaigning, i.e.,
dθj
dθi.
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dθB < 0. This completes the proof.
Proposition 3.5 reveals that campaign intensities are strategic substi-
tutes. When one party competes more aggressively by allocating a greater
proportion of its funds to campaigning, its rivals reduces the proportion of
funds allocated to campaigning. Intuitively, when the party with the elec-
toral advantage campaigns intensively, its rivals campaign spending is less
productive in terms of acquiring votes from the uninformed electorate. Al-
locating funds for personal consumption therefore becomes more attractive
for the rival.
Overall, these results suggest that the party with the electoral disadvan-
tage will embezzle a greater proportion of lobby group donations for personal
use and thus capture a smaller portion of the uninformed votes. It therefore
announces a policy platform which is closer to the ideal of the average in-
14formed voter. In contrast, the more popular party diverts a smaller portion
of its funds to personal use and adopts a policy which is closer to the prefer-
ences of the lobby group. These results indicate that electoral competition
may lessen policy distortions. With greater competition in elections there is
less incentive to propose policies that promote the views of special interest
groups (Lemma 3.3). However, this in turn induces higher contributions and
greater scope to divert these contributions for personal use (Proposition 3.4).
Electoral competition thus alters the type of corrupt behavior that emerges,
but does not prevent the abuse of political power. More intense electoral
competition lessens policy distortions, but creates incentives to extract rents
from lobby groups.
4 Conclusion
Political scandals in democracies around the world have focused attention on
the role of lobby groups in the political process. This paper has attempted
to study the nature of the interaction between political lobbying and cor-
ruption and the eﬀects of electoral competition on this relationship. It was
shown that greater political competition simply alters the form of corrupt
behavior that eventuates, but does not eliminate it. More intense electoral
competition limits the ability of a party to distort policies in favor of special
interest group and thus creates an incentive to divert campaign funds for
other uses. With greater electoral competition the lobby group is required
to pay higher contributions to the parties and the parties divert a greater
proportion of these contributions for personal use. These results therefore
suggest that there is unlikely to be a simple direct relationship between
measures of corruption or lobbying and policy distortions. Policy distor-
tions resulting from lobbying activities are likely to be greatest when there
is a little competition. On the other hand, when politicians have discretion
over the way in which political contributions are spent, greater electoral
competition increases the incentive to divert funds for personal use.
There are number of important issues that have not been considered in
this paper which warrant further research in future work. The sequential
structure of the model implies that lobby groups can determine the propor-
tion of funds that will be diverted for personal use by politicians. It would
clearly be useful to extend the model to a signaling game in which the de-
15gree to which it occurs cannot be determined with certainty. In addition,
following the existing literature it has been implicitly assumed that par-
ties cannot alter their announced policy positions. This assumption would
hold if voters are more likely to reelect politicians who support promises
made during election campaigns. However, it would be useful to explore
the consequences of allowing for the possibility that politicians renege on
their campaign promises following an election. This would clearly involve a
substantial extension of this model.
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